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On So-Called Russian Euroasianism: In Reply to Dmitry Shlapentokh
Ernest B. Hook
ebhook@berkeley.edu
Dmitry Shlapentokh’s article on Russian Eurasianism [Comparative Civilizations
Review: No. 81. 9-29, 2019] contains a number of questionable statements without any
attempt at documentation in support of his thesis. For example, in explaining why his
version of “Eurasianism” was marginalized in the “West,” he states Western observers
approached Russia from the perspective that “the triumph of American-type capitalism
…shall be the omega point of all humanity, including Russia.”[emphasis in the
original]. Moreover, “Gorbachev and Yeltsin were deeply hated by the majority.” [My
emphasis.] No references are cited in support of these extraordinary statements, which
would indeed require some impossible poll of the perspective of such observers.
Ironically, according to the web site of his own institution, although born in the Ukraine,
Shlapentokh has been in the West at least since the 1980s, [https://clas.iusb.edu/history/
faculty-and-staff/shlapentokh.html, accessed October 21, 2019], so he is a “Western
observer” himself.
He also provides in the guise of his academic approach an egregious defense of Putin’s
expansionism: Putin, Shlapentokh informs us,
1) “engaged in conflict with Ukraine only because the majority of Russian-speaking
East Ukrainians indeed wanted to be closer to Russia than to Kiev”[my
emphasis], that
2) “losing the Black Sea fleet Crimean ports would have been a strategic blow
against Russia’s geopolitical position” and
3) “…there was no desire [by Putin] to expand to territories with non-Russianspeaking people hostile to Moscow.”
These are extraordinary examples of what may be termed Putinophilia, or in analogy to
the USSR, Putinism.
Shlapentokh misstates Putin’s “desires,” which are clearly to reestablish for Russia the
role of the former USSR. A former KGB officer, he is simply shrewd enough to
calculate the cost-benefit equation in how far he can push Russia’s position, either by
small wars or military adventures as in Georgia or the Crimea, or indirectly by aiding
tyrants elsewhere as in Syria, without provoking a hot war. Shlapentokh can’t possibly
know that Putin has no desire to expand into the other former USSR republics. If there
is anything to learn from history, it is that we can no more believe Putin than any other
dictator.
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